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Book Reviews
THE TRUTH ABOUT BOULWARISM. By Lemuel R. Boul-
ware.t Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs,
Inc., 1969. Pp. 180. $7.50.
In 1947, the General Electric Company' (hereinafter GE) created
one of the more controversial negotiating strategies of the twentieth
century. The nature of this bargaining concept, the background lead-
ing to the creation, and the development and application of the tactics
that are its essentials are the basis of The Truth About Boulwarism.
Although written in 1969, this book remains of timely interest as GE
prepares for its impending 1973 labor contract negotiations. The title
for the negotiating strategy developed by GE in 1947-Boulwarism-
came from the name of the author of this book, Lemuel R. Boulware,
who is generally considered to be the founder of this concept. Herbert
R. Northrup, who had been a member of the GE employee relations
staff and a member of the 1960 GE negotiating team, contended, how-
ever, that Boulwarism had its origins deep within the history of GE,
long before Boulware himself came on the scene.2 Northrup noted that
GE, founded in 1892,3 had long sought the reputation of a "good em-
ployer," and that to do this it had practiced a form of parentalism
which was to become the basis for Boulwarism. This parentalism in-
cluded the establishment of a pension plan as early as 1912 and, at an
early date, encouragement of employee representation plans-a euphe-
mism for company unions.4
These early parentalistic policies, as benevolent as GE characterized
them had, however, undergone attack with the formation of employee
controlled unions. In 1936, the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine
Worker's Union (hereinafter UE) was formed by a coalition of various
local unions, including several which represented GE employees. After
consolidation during the war years, the UE attained a membership of
t Retired Vice President of Employee and Community Relations, General Electric
Company.
1. General Electric in 1970 was the fourth largest industrial corporation in the United
States. Sales in 1970 were $8,726,738,000. Employees totaled 396,583. FORTUNE, May 1971, at
172-73.
2. H. NORTHRUP, BOULWARISM 1 (1965) [hereinafter cited as NORTHRUP].
3. STANDARD & POOR'S CORPORATION, CORPORATION REcoRDs 8132 (1971).
4. NORTHRUP, supra note 2, at 12; see L. BOULWARE, THE TRUTH ABOUT BOULWARISM 18(1969) [hereinafter cited as BOULWARE].
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some 500,000 employees. This growth gave rise to strength. In 1946,
the UE went on strike against GE after the company refused to accede
to the union's demands as to the provisions of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, and the eventual terms for the conclusion of this strike
were regarded as a significant union victory.5 GE viewed the 1946 strike
as "little short of a debacle" for the company.6
This defeat in 1946 led GE to take another look at its employee rela-
tions policies. The company was determined to prevent a reoccurrence
of the 1946 setback 7 and it selected Lemuel R. Boulware for the posi-
tion of Vice-President of Employee and Community Relations. Boul-
ware, whose business experience had been in accounting, production,
marketing, and general management, rather than employee relations,8
was instructed to develop a program that would utilize in employee
and community relations those principles and practices that had been
found successful in other areas of business. 9 Boulware believed that to
overcome the "misled resistance" of employees to GE policies and to
obtain employee co-operation in attaining productivity increases of
some twenty per cent, it would be necessary to improve employee and
public relations. To accomplish this goal of employee acceptance of
GE programs, Boulware thought that a "job marketing" program would
have the greatest chance for success: a program based on those princi-
ples and practices employed in product marketing.'0 Research, under-
taken to determine what would be required to make this program an
effective one, concluded that the GE employees, and possibly employees
everywhere, wanted nine basic ingredients in their job package." Boul-
5. NORTHRUP, supra note 2, at 20.
6. General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 207 (1964).
7. See Note, The Employer's "Good Faith" Bargaining Duty-A Troublesome Test in
the Taft-Hartley Act, 17 W. Rxs. L. REv. 1390, 1410 (1966).
8. BOULWARE 1.
9. 150 N.L.R.B. at 207.
10. BOULWARE 24.
11. 1. Compensation, which includes:
(a) pay that is right-all things considered-for the skill, care, and full day's
effort as measured by reasonable modern standards, and
(b) extra financial benefits such as pensions, awards for ideas, free life in-
surance, scholarships, and paid vacations.
2. Working conditions which are as good as they can be made at the moment,
which are regularly improved, which are being constantly studied for further
improvement, and about which all suggestions as to additional improvements
are always welcome.
3. Supervision which is:
(a) competent technically to aid the employee to get the most out of the
machine or other facilities with reasonable physical effort, and
(b) competent as a leader to make the employee understand promptly,
clearly, and easily the reasons behind the direction or advice given so
that he can do his job intelligently and voluntarily, and
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ware professed astonishment at the results of this research because he
believed that these nine ingredients were what GE had always sought
to grant its employees. 12 Boulware thought that some employee resent-
ment to GE labor policies could be the result of a lack of understanding
by the employees that there were limitations on what the company
could supply to fill the nine point job package. Boulware sought to
explain these limitations to the employees by pointing out that in
private business there are five contributor-claimants to the activities of
a corporate enterprise-investors, customers, employees, suppliers, and
neighboring or more distant citizens (the public),'13-all of whom sup-
plied something essential to the corporation. He also noted that each
claimant demanded something in return. Thus, the company in grant-
ing these demands had to balance the interests of all five. 14 If any con-
tributor-claimant did not-or thought he did not-receive his share he
would not do his part and all others would suffer. Moreover, any favor-
itism would result in resentment by the less favored contributor-claim-
ants that would in turn result in diminishment of their efforts. 15
Boulware argued that management was best suited to make the proper
allocation between the five contributor-claimants because "manage-
ment knows best what should be done for its employees,"' 6 and there-
fore management should "play God" in determining who received
(c) competent as a counselor or as a guide to good counsel when the em-
ployee seeks aid in personal matters.
4. Job security to the greatest degree possible through the team-work of em-
ployees, management, stockholders, and loyal customers.
5. Respect for basic human dignity which is protected along with the rest of the
employee's stake as a free, upstanding, good American citizen.
6. Promotion as fast as opportunities arise or can be created and on a strictly
fair basis in view of the skill, care, and effort of the individual employee, with
the employee's own ability and ambition being aided to every extent possible
by training on the job.
7. Information on management's objectives, plans, problems, successes, and fail-
ures, and current expectations for the section, the department, and the com-
pany as a whole.
8. Belief in the individual job's importance, significance, and challenge, and in
the employee's contributions to the great good accomplished by the final GE
product.
9. Satisfaction that comes from going home to the family after a day's work
with the feeling that something important has been accomplished, that the
accomplishment has gained the attention and earned the respect and grati-
tude of one's fellow employees at all levels, and that job is a good one to
return to the next and following days.
Id. at 26-28.
12. Id. at 28.
13. Id. at 7.
14. Id. at 7-17.
15. Id. at 29; NORTHRUP, supra note 2, at 30.
16. Blum, Collective Bargaining Ritual or Reality, 39 HARv. Bus. REv. 63, 64 (Nov.-Dec.
1961) [hereinafter cited as Blum]. Compare BOULWA"R 57, with cartoon at 48.
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what portion of the corporate pie, rather than the employees who
would only be seeking to increase their share and would not objec-
tively consider the interests of the other contributor-claimants. 7 To
cultivate confidence in the employees that management was making
the right decision, Boulware thought it necessary to convince the em-
ployees that the company was willing to "do right" for the employees
voluntarily, that is, without prodding from strikes or threat of strikes.'
To sell this nine point job package, and its limitations, a massive
communications program was instituted. The program was designed
to reach every employee. Middle management was given training pro-
grams for instructions on how to communicate GE's policies to the
employees, and the company acquired films and other training aids and
granted employees time off from their work to view the films. This in-
struction was designed to inform the employees of other demands on
the revenues of the company and to show that the company was looking
out for the interest of all contributor-claimants. In addition to the films
the employee newsletter distributed by the company was used as a
propaganda tool for selling company policies. Massive advertising in
commercial newspapers was also used to present the company's posi-
tions. This program was designed after the advertising program used
so successfully in selling GE products, and Boulware emphasized that
this communication program was to be a continual one, rather than
just a campaign instituted as negotiating sessions neared. This then
was how Boulware was going to convince the employees that the com-
pany was going to "do right" voluntarily.19
Application of this job marketing program necessitated a revision of
the company's approach to collective bargaining. GE believed that it
would have to abandon the traditional type of bargaining in which
both sides take extreme positions and reach settlement through give-
and-take compromises; 20 otherwise, the employees would be convinced
that GE was not trying to do right voluntarily and as a result would
seek to coerce the company to grant greater benefits. Further, to estab-
lish the creditability of its program of doing right voluntarily for em-
17. Northrup, The Case for Boulwarism, 41 HARV. Bus. REV. 86, 88 (Sept.-Oct. 1963)
[hereinafter cited as Northrup]. In BOULWARE 62-63, the author suggests a more
earthly, but no less pious, role for management.
18. 150 N.L.R.B. at 207; see BOULWARE 57.
19. See Abramson, The Anatomy of Boulwarism with a Discussion of Forkosch, 19
CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 459, 462 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Abramson]. See generally BoUL-
WARE 24-78.
20. 150 N.L.R.B. at 207; BOULWA"1 87.
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ployees, GE believed it would be necessary to research very carefully
and determine what it could offer to the employees. The result of this
research would then be what the company would offer to the employ-
ees. If the union provided new information during negotiations then
the company could change its offer on that basis,21 but the company
would not change its offer because of such criterion as strike or threat
of strikes from the employees22 because to capitulate from such coercion
would indicate that GE was not doing as much as it could for the em-
ployees "voluntarily." Thus, the Boulware negotiating strategy was
that the company would eschew the usual bargaining methodology in
which both parties began negotiating from extreme positions which
they knew would have to be modified before a settlement could be
reached.23 Instead, GE would carefully analyze the needs of the five
contributor-claimants and the resources available for allocation. This
consideration would be made from all available information. Nothing
would be held back for later trading or compromising.24 Instead the
company would announce its offer and attempt to convince the em-
ployees to accept the offer through a massive advertising program. And,
while the company would make modifications in this offer based upon
new information brought out in negotiating sessions, it would not
change its offer because of any deadline or strike threat by the union.25
Boulwarism, in short, is presented as a scientific, good faith, "take it
or leave it" package presented by management 26 in which the com-
pany's position will be modified only upon receipt of new information
that the company did not have in formulating its offer.27 Stripped of
21. BOULWARE 89-90; NORTHRUP, supra note 2, at 27-28.
22. Selekman, Cynicism and Managerial Morality, 36 HAsv. Bus. REv. 61, 64 (Sept.-Oct.
1958).
23. Note, "Boulwarism": Legality and Effect, 76 HARV. L. REv. 807, 808 (1963).
24. Note, Good Faith Bargaining and the GE Case-The NLRB Views Boulwarism and
Other Bargaining Practices, 53 GEO. L.J. 1115, n.2 (1965). See also BOULWARE 117-18.
25. Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 248, 288
n.258 (1964).
26. Fanning, The Duty To Bargain in 1962, 14 LAB. L.J. 18, 19 (1963).
27. Professor Morris Forkosch found that Boulwarism was a ten point program:
1. GE would engage in intensive year round research into all "pertinent" facts
relevant to its relations with its employees;
2. Throughout the entire period between contracts, the company would inform
its employees of all facts pertinent to their conditions, e.g., wages, company
policies, and other efforts;
3. At the inception of bargaining, and yet still as part of its overall research
pattern, GE would listen to the unions' presentations and take into account the
additional facts supplied;
4. Assuming both sides had done their homework properly, then they should
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its verbiage, Boulwarism as a negotiating strategy may be viewed as a
firm offer by management that it will not reduce.
The first application of Boulwarism was in the 1948 negotiations.
GE widely publicized its offer before the negotiations began. Full page
advertisements explaining the company's position were placed in news-
papers in the communities in which the company had plants. 28 Union
resistance failed to materialize and the GE opening offer was accepted
by the UE virtually as it was first presented by the company. This was
cause for great celebration at GE and it was believed that Boulwarism
was an unqualified success.
The 1948 negotiations, however, marked the end of the UE as the
dominant union at GE. These negotiations were only partly responsi-
ble for the demise of this union because it had been profligated by
internal strife over the issue of communism which subsequently led to
a division in the electrical workers. James Carey headed a dissident
faction that, after rejecting the ideals and goals of communism,2 9 with-
drew from the UE and formed the International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers of America80 (hereinafter IUE). Com-
petitive strife between the UE and IUE and the independence of the
locals of each union prevented the unions from dealing effectively with
management. In addition to these woes the UE and IUE were not the
only unions at GE, for nearly a quarter of the union members at GE
both desire voluntarily and willingly to cooperate in having each obtain just
shares;
5. Assuming there were new and pertinent facts, GE would then evaluate the
unions' demands in the light of the totality of the facts now before it;
6. This evaluation concluded, GE would next make and publicize its own deter-
mination of what it considered to be "right";
7. This determination would embrace everything GE found to be warranted and
be presented to the unions without holding anything back for any trading
or compromising;
8. The GE offer would be subject to adjustment by GE whenever (but only
when) new information from any source or a significant change in facts in-
dicates that its initial offer fell short of being right;
9. On the basis of all of the proceeding, (sic) the traditional method of bargain-
ing would not be required, i.e., the give-and-take compromise need not be
used;
10. Assuming no adjustment would be necessitated by new or changed facts, then
as a matter of company policy, the determination, ultimately presented to all
unions and unrepresented employees, would not be changed. GE would with-
stand a strike of any duration to resist doing what it considered to be wrong.
Forkosch, Boulwarism: Will Labor-Management Relations Take It or Leave It? 19 CATHO-
LIC U.L. REv. 311, 313-15 (1970).
28. NORTHRUP, supra note 2, at 51-52; see BouLwARE 31-57.
29. Northrup, supra note 17, at 90.




were in ten major unions and in many other smaller bargaining units.3'
GE also had other advantages that would assist in the success of Boul-
warism.
The General Electric Company today operates two hundred plants
in thirty-one states and Puerto Rico, and it has about eighty-four plants
in twenty-four foreign countries. It produces consumer products such
as air conditioners, color televisions, and other household electrical
appliances, aerospace components, power generation equipment, elec-
trical equipment such as transformers, motors, and lamps, military
electronics equipment, and medical equipment such as X-ray ma-
chines.3 2 This diversity made ineffective such union tactics as "key
plant strikes,"-a tactic designed to injure as few employees as possi-
ble while maximizing economic coercion against the employer-where
a key plant is struck rather than all of the employer's operations.3
It was believed by some observers that Boulwarism was possibly de-
signed to deepen the divisions in the unions, and that GE was pursu-
ing a divide and conquer strategy3 4 in which Boulware's communication
program was used as a medium for attacks on union leaders and even
the nature of collective action itself.35 The IUE had quickly become
the dominant union at GE, and James Carey, as President of the IUE,
received his first taste of Boulwarism in the 1950 negotiations. The
company had refused separate negotiations with the IUE and offered
the same package to the IUE that had been offered to other unions
and non-union employees. Carey, however, rejected the initial GE offer
and when the company refused to move from its position he called a
series of rolling strikes, which were successive walkouts at various
plants. But Carey failed to receive sufficient support from the local
unions to make this tactic effective, and an agreement was reached
which appeared as another victory for GE.3 6
The next ten years of relations between GE and the IUE were
marked by a growing acrimony between James Carey and GE manage-
ment. But during this period GE scored success after success in nego-
31. Kuhn, A New View of Boulwarism: The Significance of the GE Strike, 21 LAB. L.J.
582, 588 (1970).
32. STANDARD & POOR'S CORPORATION, CORPORATION REcoRDs 8131 (1971).
33. Northrup, supra note 17, at 86.
34. COLLECrIVE BARGAINING FORUM, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING TODAY 160-61 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as COLLECTIVE BARGAINING TODAY].
35. Cf. Cooper, Bulwarism and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 20 RUTGERS L.
REv. 653, 662-64 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Cooper].
36. NORTHRUP, supra note 2, at 52-53.
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tiating sessions; the company did make some minor concessions in
negotiations after receipt of new information but it did not suffer what
may be termed a defeat at the negotiating table during this period.37
While there were some minor strikes, none were effective. For the most
part strikes called by union leaders lacked support from the union
membership and GE hailed this lack of support as a victory for Boul-
warism. The company pointed out that in other firms strike votes were
merely automatic when requested by the union leaders. 38 As noted, one
result of the GE success was an embittered union leadership. James
Carey, at least from accounts by company officials, raved as if he were
a madman during negotiations.3 9 A National Labor Relations Board
Trial Examiner was later to find that Carey did threaten physical vio-
lence and that he engaged on occasions in time consuming harrangues
and presentations of irrelevant, "but interesting" subjects. The Trial
Examiner thought this conduct was due at least in part to frustration
in Carey's failure to achieve success in negotiations with GE, and in
part to the fact that Carey was "an aggressive, highly articulate, and
voluble negotiator with a bent for tough talk and invective." This con-
duct, however, was found not to have had any influence on the out-
come of negotiations,40 but GE did seize on it to attack the union
leadership in its communication programs. 41
Union officials were particularly incensed by the company's commu-
nications program42 in which GE had stressed the theme that union
leadership was selfish, irresponsible, and motivated by political aspira-
tions in their capacity as elected officers. Irving Abramson, General
Counsel for the IUE, thought that Boulware was a strong anti-union-
ist43 and that his bias was woven into the job merchandising program
37. 150 N.L.R.B. at 208.
38. NORTHRUP, supra note 2, at 61-69.
39. Minutes from negotiating sessions show that Mr. Carey offered to "walk all over"
a company official's face, and Carey warned that he was going to "break every bone" in
another company negotiator's body. Id. at 83, 84, 168-73.
40. 150 N.L.R.B. at 219.
41. This communication system was massive. During the 1960 negotiations and strike
the company sent 246 separate written communications to workers in its Schenectady
plant and 177 items to workers in its Pittsfield, Mass. plant. Gross, Cullen & Hanslowe,
Good Faith in Labor Negotiations: Tests and Remedies, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1009, 1026
(1968).
42. Boulware had on one occasion stated that Arizona was given a GE plant because
the state had passed a right to work law. He had also condemned unions as promoting,
"[s]omething for nothing, inflating, foreign, socialist brand of anti-business economics."
Blum, supra note 16, at 64.
43. Abramson, supra note 19, at 463.
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that made up the communication program. To support his contention
Abramson pointed to a statement by Boulware that compulsory union
membership fostered union monopolies that in time opened the unions
to possible control by union racketeers and demagogues. 44 But, even if
the GE communication program had been less critical of the union
leadership it is doubtful that the union officials' resistance to Boul-
warism would have been any less strenuous. The company was under-
mining the strength of the union officialdom by direct appeals to the
employees, by-passing the union leaders. Moreover, injury to union
officers was compounded when negotiations resulted in acceptance of
the original, or very close to the original, offer of the company.45 This
resentment engendered in union officials by Boulwarism set the stage
for a "showdown" in the 1960 negotiations.
In 1958, the union had suffered another defeat in negotiations over
adjustments under a wage reopening provision of the 1955 collective
bargaining agreement. The union had failed to gain concessions from
the company or to acquire sufficient support from the employees for a
strike which was a severe setback for the IUE, and the union leaders
were determined to gain substantial concessions from GE in the 1960
negotiations. Indeed, James Carey was quoted in 1959 as saying, "I owe
GE a strike. '4 The union's preparations for the negotiations were in-
tensive.
Carey tightened his grip over the IUE locals by having the 1958
IUE convention grant him the power to place dissident locals in trustee-
ship and the IUE also began a communication program of its own.
Union officials gave numerous speeches; movies were prepared; and an
IUE caravan was dispatched to tour the various GE plants with a large
trailer that contained exhibits and propaganda castigating GE's em-
ployee relation's programs. To further assure a successful strike, the
IUE changed its charter so that a majority vote of the GE conference
board could call a national strike instead of the previously required
two-thirds vote.47 The IUE also joined with other unions at GE so that
a united labor front could be presented to the company. 48 GE in turn
began an extensive communications program to propagandize its posi-
44. BOULWARE 129.
45. 418 F.2d at 741.
46. Northrup, supra note 17, at 86; BOuLWARE 103-05.
47. 150 N.L.R.B. at 210.
48. See generally NORTHRUP, supra note 2, at 71-76.
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tion 49 stressing the finality of its offer and the fixed policy of the com-
pany in not making concessions to avoid a strike. ° Strike votes were
taken by the IUE and a voting majority approved of a strike, though a
numerical majority did not. The strike when called became violent in
some areas, while in others it was ignored by the workers. A strong back
to work movement soon developed and the strike was terminated after
only three weeks. GE made only minor concessions5' and the company
was elated by an editorial in the New York Times calling the IUE
defeat, "the worst setback any union had received in a nationwide strike
since World War II".52 This defeat, and other prior failures by IUE
President James Carey to gain concessions from GE, was apparently in
large part responsible for the subsequent loss of his post as President of
the IUE in a hotly contested union election. 53
After the conclusion of the strike the IUE filed an unfair labor prac-
tice complaint with the National Labor Relations Board,54 in which
the union contended that Boulwarism violated section 8(a)(5) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act.55 That section made it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees.
A provision of the Labor-Management Relations Act defined collec-
tive bargaining as the duty to meet and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.56 In NLRB v. Ins. Agent's Union,57 the Supreme Court had stated
that good faith bargaining was a process in which the parties deal with
each other in a serious and good faith attempt to reach agreement. 58 The
Court said it was not simply an occasion for formal meetings between
management and labor where each would maintain a "take it or leave
it" attitude. 59 This opinion may not indicate, however, that Boulwarism
49. Forkosch, "Take It or Leave It" as a Bargaining Technique, 18 LAB. L.J. 676, 681
(1967).
50. Forkosch, "Take It or Leave It" as a Bargaining Technique, 3 CALIF. W.L. REV.
43, 50 (1967).
51. NORTHRUP, supra note 2, at 85-90.
52. Id. at 90.
53. Cooper, supra note 35, at 655 n.39.
54. Northrup, supra note 17, at 92.
55. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 140, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)
(5) (1970).
56. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 140, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1970).
57. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
58. See Comment, Boulwarism and Good Faith Collective Bargaining, 63 MICH. L. REV.
1473, 1476 (1965).
59. Cf. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346
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was a violation of section 8(a)(5), for Boulwarism is a carefully articu-
lated strategy to reach an agreement. GE by its own admission expended
over $2,000,000 for a single aspect of its communication program, and
untold sums in other areas, to convince employees to accept the com-
pany's offer.60 Moreover, GE believed that its firm position at the nego-
tiating table was the best method of reaching agreement. The company
also believed that it was not assuming an arbitrary negotiating position
since much research went into the preparation of its offer, which, GE
professed a willingness to change when presented with information that
would show the company's own computation was in error as to what
it could offer without injury to the other contributor-claimants to the
enterprise. GE had previously made at least minor concessions during
negotiations when presented with such information.61 GE believed that
section 8(a)(5) did not require the parties to make concessions in col-
lective bargaining.6 2 The company believed that there was no reason
for going through the traditional charade of taking an artificial and
extreme position to reach the position which it intended to enter the
negotiations with initially, i.e. the position beyond which it would not
go even if struck by the unions.
The NLRB trial examiner, however, found that GE had been guilty
of unfair labor practices during the 1960 negotiations6 3 and the Board
upheld his findings stating that GE's overall bargaining strategy evi-
denced a "take it or leave it" attitude which violated the company's
duty to bargain with its employees.6 4 The Board viewed the one offer
aspect of Boulwarism as devitalizing the negotiations and robbing them
of their commonly accepted meaning, of an ask-and-bid, or auction
form of bargaining. The Board held that each party has the right to
play an active role in negotiations which it believed the union could
not do under Boulwarism as presented in the 1960 negotiations.65 The
Board condemned GE's communication program, holding that an em-
ployer must bargain with the statutory representative rather than with
U.S. 887 (1953); Comment, General Electric's Firm Offer Approach Held Bad Faith, 40
N.Y.U.L. REv. 798, 799 (1965).
60. BOULWARE 34.
61. But see 150 N.L.R.B. at 208.
62. See 43 TEXAs L. REv. 974, 977 (1965). But see Kuelthau, The NLRB and the Duty
to Make Concessions in Bargaining, 18 LAB. L.J. 201 (1967).
63. The trial examiner felt that GE's communication program was an attempt to deal
directly with the employees, by passing the union leadership. The trial examiner also
based his findings on the fact that GE refused to willingly make concessions in negotia.
tions. NORTHRUP, supra note 2, at 94.
64. 150 N.L.R.B. 192 (1964).
65. Id. at 194.
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the employees themselves by direct or indirect communication. The
Board thought that GE's communication program was designed to dis-
parage and discredit the union leaders in the eyes of their employee
constituents. In order to pursuade the employees to exert pressure on
the union leadership to accept the GE offer and to create the impression
that the "employer rather than the union is the true protector of the
employees' interests," 66 GE was ordered to cease and desist from these
practices.
The NLRB order was enforced by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals67 in NLRB v. General Electric Company.68 The Second Circuit,
however, found three specific unfair labor practices by GE.69 One was
GE's refusal to furnish information to the unions after negotiations
began. Another was that GE had dealt separately with several of the
IUE locals rather than the national union which was the certified repre-
sentative of the union: a violation of section 9(a) of the Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act,70 which makes the bargaining representative of a
certified union exclusive in this function. The Court found the third
unfair labor practice in the "take it or leave it" stance that GE assumed
over an insurance proposal. This was true, said the Court, even though
the parties had waived the right to bargain over this question, since GE
had offered to add to the plan but refused to bargain over the addition.
The Court also addressed itself to the question of whether GE had
committed an unfair labor practice from its overall negotiating conduct
under its Boulwarism policies. The Board's decision below had been
based on GE's overall conduct, even though taken in isolation each
specific act would not be an unfair labor practice. 71 The Second Circuit
said that the failure to make concessions would not be evidence of bad
faith bargaining, but the presence of concessions would raise a strong
inference of good faith.7 2 The Court did object to GE's communication
66. Id. at 195.
67. GE sought review of the NLRB decision in the Second Circuit but at approximately
the same time the union filed a similar petition with the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. The NLRB broke the impasse by seeking to enforce its order in the Second
Circuit where the unfair labor practice had been committed. Comment, Boulwarism and
Good Faith Collective Bargaining, 63 MIcH. L. Ray. 1473, 1481 (1965) (The judicial history
of this litigation is also set out in NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 738, 739 (2d Cir.
1969). The broad jurisdictional and venue requirements of the LMRA made these actions
possible. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)T() (1970).
68. 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970).
69. Id. at 750.
70. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
71. 418 F.2d at 755.
72. Id. at 758.
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program in that when the company publicized its offer before the union
had opportunity to propose suggested modifications, it was put into the
position of taking a stand that would be difficult to retreat from. Thus,
the communication program conducted by GE resulted in a "take it or
leave it" position, because, by the company's own admission, it branded
any compromise a defeat. 73 The Court, however, did not forbid the use
of the Boulwarism "best offer first" and the massive communication
program that publicized the offer. Instead, the Court said it was merely
forbidding a "take it or leave it" bargaining method resulting from a
widely publicized stance of firmness that prevented the employer from
altering a stance once taken. 4 This was not the wholesale censure of
Boulwarism found in the NLRB decision.
The Second Circuit was not faced with Boulwarism at its finest in
General Electric as the company had committed three specific unfair
labor practices; it would appear that GE could avoid that part of
the Second Circuit's decision condemning its Boulwarism strategy by
emphasizing in its communication program that it was willing to com-
promise, if the union could show the company new information that
would allow it to adjust its best offer.75 This would merely be a state-
ment of one of the principles of Boulwarism rather than a deviation
from this strategy since the company would not be in a purely take it
or leave it position.
The decision by the National Labor Relations Board in the interim76
had not signaled the death knoll for Boulwarism. GE, apparently un-
daunted by this decision, continued to apply its Boulwarism policies.
In 1969, however, the unions were able to confront GE with a unity
they had lacked since 1946, when GE suffered the defeat that led to the
creation of Boulwarism. 7 After GE assumed its "fair but firm" bargain-
ing stance in 1969 the unions went on a strike that was to last for some
thirteen weeks.78 Aided by the decision of the Second Circuit, supra,
handed down two days after the strike began, the strikes were success-
ful.7 9 Paul Jennings, President of the IUE, believed that the two ele-
ments of strike unity and the Second Circuit's decision were keys to
73. Id. at 759-60.
74. Id. at 762.
75. BOULWARE 89-90. However, Irving Abramson, General Counsel for the IUE had
stated that in his opinion the Second Circuit's decision had buried Boulwarism. Courier-
Journal, Oct. 29, 1969, § A, at I, col. 5.
76. 150 N.L.R.B. at 192.
77. Courier-Journal, Oct. 28, 1969, § A, at 7, col. 6.
78. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING TODAY, supra note 34, at 151.
79. AFL-CIO News, Nov. 1, 1969, at 1, col. 5.
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the IUE's success, 80 but an additional factor was the sympathy boycotts
conducted by the AFL-CIO at major department and appliance stores
across the nation during the Christmas shopping season.8 ' This victory
came in the face of a massive GE communication effort, in which the
union contended GE had made expenditures at a "$2,000,000 clip"
to spread the company's theme that "everyone would be happy to return
to work if strikers were not shackled by labor bosses.' 8 2
The Union victory was claimed to be a victory over Boulwarism. The
company was forced to abandon its Boulwarism principle of not grant-
ing concessions, and tough give-and-take bargaining was engaged in
by both parties. George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, claimed
that the 1969-1970 negotiations were the end of Boulwarism 8 -prior to
the strike Meany had declared that the 1969-1970 negotiations with GE
were a matter of idealogical warfare and that Boulwarism as practiced
by GE made the fight one for survival of collective bargaining and the
American Trade movement.84
Whether Boulwarism has been laid to rest may be determined by
future negotiations, but whatever the outcome of those negotiations
it will not dissipate the doubts that the 1969-1970 negotiations cast on
the viability of Boulwarism as a negotiating concept. One writer noted
that where economic pressure was applied to both sides, sufficient to
hurt each party, both union and management "were persuaded of the
wisdom of compromising their stands to achieve a workable settle-
ment."8 6 Thus, when the union achieved sufficient unity to exert real
economic pressure against GE the company capitulated just as have
other employers in similar circumstances who were not utilizing Boul-
warism. Consequently, it would appear that the test for success in
labor negotiating may be economic strength rather than idealistic prac-
tices by an employer.
GE was successful in its negotiations from 1947 to 1969 and it is true
that Boulwarism was inaugurated and applied during this period, but
to measure the success of Boulwarism it is necessary to look at other
factors that may have contributed to GE's success. The UE was weak-
80. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING TODAY, supra note 34, at 155.
81. AFL-CIO News, Jan. 3, 1970, at 1, col. 1.
82. AFL-CIO News, Jan. 3, 1970, at 3, col. 4.
83. AFL-CIO News, Feb. 7, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
84. AFL-CIO News, Nov. 15, 1969, at 1, col. 5.
85. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING TODAY, supra note 34, at 167.




ened by the division over the communism issue and the IUE was a
splinter union that could not have been expected to have reached ma-
turity for several years. Furthermore, GE had widely diverse operations
with many different unions and many non-union employees-even a
single unified union would have difficulty in exercising control over the
GE conglomerate. Therefore, it is possible that GE could have achieved
its successes by adoption of any hard line bargaining stance, since it
held a position of control during this period. The success of Boulwarism
may be measurable here, if at all, by the extent to which Boulwarism
retarded union growth, since union strength in 1969 proved that a
unified labor force could defeat Boulwarism. But the initial weakness
of the unions and the diversity of GE enterprises may make even this
formula unworkable. In any event, Boulwarism has yet to be proven
to be superior to traditional give-and-take bargaining.
Management is generally opposed to collective bargaining because it
entails cooperation, which may in turn require a greater sharing of
profits with employees. s 7 Boulwarism was designed to avoid the coopera-
tion required in collective bargaining by employing practices success-
fully used in selling GE products. However, in marketing its products,
GE was concerned with demand creation, i.e., a demand was created
that the consumer did not have before being confronted with the psy-
chological motivation engendered by the GE marketing techniques.
This demand creation had sought market enlargement through upward
demand adjustment, but, in Boulwarism, the company was seeking
demand diminishment. The employee would be continually expecting
greater benefits in succeeding years because of the principle of rising
expectations. Therefore, GE had to convince its employees that they
needed the benefits offered by management rather than what the em-
ployees themselves believed they needed. This was truly an unchartered
sea for even the most sophisticated of marketing specialists had their
training in demand creation, or demand increase, rather than demand
diminishment. To be successful GE had to convince the employee that
he would be better off with less. The difficulty of this task is enormous.
Other entrepreneurs have succumbed to this obstacle by emphasizing
increased productivity in the workers-the worker will be producing
more at the same rate as opposed to the GE concept of producing the
same amount at a lesser rate, or a rate dictated by the company. GE
could not effectively increase productivity by the usual stock option
87. K. BRAUN, UNION MANAGEMENT CO-OPERATION 13 (1947).
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and profit sharing techniques because of the diversity of its operations.
Further, the nature of most of the union employees' jobs was such that
the employees would not believe their individual efforts to increase pro-
ductivity would be reflected in a profit sharing program and conse-
quently would not be motivated to increase productivity efforts. GE
believed instead that advertising techniques could be used to motivate
workers and to lessen their demands on company revenues. The success
of this effort defies measurement, but in 1969 it appears that there was
no sale.
The Truth About Boulwarism is an attempt to lend creditability to
a company's effort to dictate the terms of wages and working institutes
to its employees. This book, however, fails to recognize the reality of
the collective power of the unions. Power that is unlikely to be re-
linquished for a program that hinges on the unilateral generosity of
management. Prescience may be required to predict the success of
Boulwarism but the answer may lie in the 1973 negotiations at GE, for
which the parties are girding themselves to do battle. Indeed, skirmish-
ing has already commenced in the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit where the court, in General Electric Company v.
NLRB,88 ordered GE to relinquish correlated area wage survey data
which the court believed the union needed to check the accuracy of
GE's claim as to the basis of its wage scales.
Jerry W. Markham*
88. 41 U.S.L.W. 2182 (6th Cir. Sept. 15, 1972).
* B.S., Western Kentucky University; J.D., University of Kentucky. Attorney-Advisor,
Office of the General Counsel, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Wash-
ington, D.C.
The Securities and Exchange Commission as a matter of policy disclaims responsibility
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DRUGS AND THE PUBLIC. By Norman E. Zinbergt and
John A. Robertson.4 New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972.
Pp. 288. $8.95.
The cuisine of this well-written, authoritative epic is based princi-
pally on fact and philosophy and is one of the better books on the sub-
ject of drugs to appear this month. It is difficult for a busy book reviewer
to keep up with so many drug abuse compendia reaching the lay mar-
ket; so many authorities saying the same things in different ways!
The back-page promoters of this book made it easy to review. The
three quotes on the quality of the book given in summation say: "Read
it and assimilate its contents. Every lawmaker and enforcer, and anyone
interested in this major domestic issue must read it." I agree with these
recommendations. It is one of the better dialogs on the modern drug
problem. Chapter One presents an acceptable and easily understood
overview of the drug issue. In Chapter Two, the authors explain the
public attitudes toward illegal drug use and beg for a change in this
attitude toward understanding, as opposed to fear. The authors do
inject their own political philosophy into the issue of drug use and
users, but this is acceptable because you do know where they stand on
the issue. They do an acceptable job on explaining drug use, although
it may be difficult for many to understand their technical manner of
presentation. The more one knows about pharmacology, psychology,
sociology and human behavior in general, the easier it is to understand
Chapter Three.
Chapter Five deals at length with the British system of dealing with
their drug problem. This chapter explains many of the misunderstand-
ings and poor explanations about the British "success."
The remainder of the book deals with the drug laws, their costs and
successes and failures. The most interesting and daring chapter is the
last. The authors discuss alternatives for drug control. Regardless of
what is done, we will continue to have a drug problem, in my opinion.
Regardless of the control mechanisms, some individuals will find ways
to bypass the control. The best that we can hope for is a minimization
of the problem.
t Professor of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School; Psychiatrist-in-Chief at the Wash-
ingtonian Center for Addiction.
I Member of Massachusetts Bar; currently a Teaching Fellow at the Harvard Law
School and a Russell Sage Fellow.
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The authors suggest a license for drug use. You carry a permit to
get drugsl They suggest several methodologies in the licensing model,
but I personally consider it bureaucratic and in the permissive direc-
tion. I prefer to work toward a drug-free society and not take the easy
way out by allowing certain "sins" because "they are going to do it
anyway."
The book provides a lot of material for drug debates on both sides.
The authors do not provide anything new in the way of solving the
drug problem, but they do provide fuel that may stimulate movement
in constipated thinking to provide brain waves for mental castrates.
Charles L. Winek*
* Chief Toxicologist, Allegheny County Coroner's Office; Professor of Toxicology,
Duquesne University.
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